PT PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Grounds for Cooperation in the Radicalisation Governance Milieu? A Qualitative Exploration of Stakeholder Issue Frames of Online Radicalisation

Irene van Oorschot,* Giorgio Touburg, Alexander Strelkov and Gabriele Jacobs

Volume XVIII, Issue 3
September 2024

ISSN: 2334-3745
DOI: 10.19165/2024.7550

Abstract: In the study of online radicalisation, little attention has been paid to the way local stakeholders within the broader online radicalisation milieu define, frame, and problematise online radicalisation. As these conceptions and problematisations are crucial to the possibility of cooperation and coordination between them, this lacuna represents a curious oversight. Drawing on a cross-national and highly diverse sample of stakeholders, including law enforcement actors, religious and community leaders, policy-makers and activists, and scientific experts, we inductively identify four largely shared 'issue frames'. We conceptualise issue frames as ways of organising knowledge and meaning, and as crucial to the way problems – in this case online radicalisation – come to be defined, constructed, and contested by various social actors. Uncovering four shared issue frames, we show how stakeholders commonly 1) highlight the tension between individual and social understanding of radicalisation; 2) reflect on the national embeddedness of radicalisation discourse; 3) comment on the complex politics of online radicalisation monitoring; and 4) warn against the mysteries inherent in algorithmic surveillance and control. Demonstrating that these specific issue frames are largely shared between a highly diverse group of stakeholders, we emphasise the need for cooperation and coordination between these actor groups.

Keywords: Radicalisation, online radicalisation, qualitative research, interviews, stakeholders, security

* *Corresponding author: Irene van Oorschot, Erasmus University Rotterdam, email: vanoorschot@essb.eur.nl*

Online Radicalisation: A Contested and Contestable Term

On the 6th January, 2021, a large group of protestors stormed the Capitol Building in Washington, looking for ways to stop the supposed 'steal' of the US election. The digital app *Parler* had functioned as a crucial coordination and planning technology for individuals looking to overturn the supposed 'theft' of the elections by the Democratic candidate Joe Biden. In the same month, the Dutch extreme-right party Forum for Democracy (FvD) splintered due to leaked antisemitic jokes from its youth department's *WhatsApp* group. These simultaneous events demonstrate that online communications and the internet play a crucial role in processes of radicalisation. Since then, online disinformation campaigns by specific groups or states increasingly fed into the distrust of citizens in public institutions and, in this way, also became a threat to democracies on a larger scale.[1] These events highlight the importance of studying online radicalisation and exploring better monitoring and governance of online platforms amid national security threats. Europe, for example, has seen terrorist attacks from a variety of groups, such as jihadist, ethno-nationalist, left-wing, right-wing and single-issue groups.[2]

Radicalisation does not necessarily lead to violent extremism or terrorism, but refers to the cognitive embracing of extremist opinions. Such cognitive radicalisation may lead to behavioural radicalisation.[3] The internet plays an increasing role in such radicalisation processes, as it makes it easier to disseminate, promote and justify hate speech and recruit vulnerable individuals.[4] While extremist groups do not solely rely on the internet, they may use online content for recruitment and desensitisation purposes.[5] Obviously, not every cognitively radicalised person will commit extremist violence, yet online radicalisation does represent a sensitive and crucial phase in broader radicalisation processes. Understanding and intervening in this phase is generally taken to be an important tool in de-radicalisation and anti-terrorist activities.

Radicalisation has no generally accepted definition. A comprehensive review of 270 studies points to the multileveled nature of the phenomenon.[6] This includes geopolitical factors, such as wars or societal polarisation, environmental factors, such as family relationships or other social relations, and individual factors, such as the experience of a trigger event or specific psychological vulnerabilities.[7] Moreover, the concept of radicalisation is mobilised in a variety of political agendas, institutional processes, and different *issue frames,*[8] so that its meaning is far from stable across contexts. In the field of policy analysis and the sociology of meaning-making, issue frames are generally understood to be the ways by which specific social problems or controversies come to be defined and constructed.[9] Often, these issue frames introduce a specific understanding of the social problem or situation and, in that sense, also attribute (political, legal, social) responsibilities over specific actors. Radicalisation as a phenomenon has been subject to a variety of such issue frames. For instance, securitisation issue frames construct radicalisation primarily as a national threat and highlight the role and responsibility of law enforcement in combating it. Community-centred issue frames define and construct radicalisation as rooted in community life and organisations, and tend to point out the role of community leaders, like religious and civil society leaders, in tackling it.[10] Working with a heuristic definition, however, we understand online radicalisation as a process by which individuals' 'moral, ethical, logical and emotional societal norms and awareness are compromised through the use of online activities', which then creates an 'increased risk of supporting, or directly engaging in, possibly illegal and anti-societal activities'.[11] As this process is intrinsically multi-layered and multi-faceted in nature, this heuristic also suggests that a multitude of diverse stakeholders needs to be involved to tackle this phenomenon: law enforcement actors, but religious and community leaders, policy-makers and political activists, and experts as well.

Stakeholder Conceptions of Radicalisation: Our Contribution

The academic literature on the concept of radicalisation has, however, produced a specific empirical blind spot. In contesting the meaning and stability of the concept of radicalisation, scholars have so far failed to engage systematically with the way societal actors and stakeholders themselves define, understand, and frame radicalisation. This is a curious lacuna, because law enforcement professionals, religious and community leaders, as well as political activists and experts, are thought to play an important role in detecting, preventing, and responding to online radicalisation. As radicalisation itself is notoriously difficult to define, operationalise, and monitor in any straightforward sense,[12] this relative neglect of stakeholder perspectives is rather surprising.[13] A few studies helpfully show how, for instance, specific understandings of radicalisation inform practices of community policing,[14] or explore conceptions of mechanisms of radicalisation and deradicalisation among social workers.[15] This article builds upon these efforts to examine how such societal stakeholders within the broader radicalisation governance milieu perceive and understand online radicalisation. In so doing, we advance contemporary approaches to online radicalisation by demonstrating how online radicalisation is subject to particular issue frames that define, construct, and contest (dimensions of) online radicalisation.

Drawing on a uniquely diverse sample of both Law Enforcement Actors (LEAs) and non-LEA stakeholders across seven European nations, we identify four dominant issue frames that inform the way stakeholders approach the definition, the explanation, the governance, and monitoring of online radicalisation. In so doing, we broaden the scope of contemporary approaches to the concept of radicalisation and identify a set of surprising frame *resonances and convergences* between these stakeholder perceptions. As such, not only do our data present a strong case for understanding and accounting for these stakeholder perspectives; it also complicates the dominant assumption that limited forms of cooperation and coordination between these stakeholders are due to an absence of shared meanings and frames. Instead, we show that both LEAs and other stakeholders go well beyond the securitisation issue frame, for instance, and identify similar dilemmas when it comes to the monitoring and governance of online radicalisation. In this article, we introduce the problem of cooperation and coordination within broader radicalisation government networks in more detail, then move on to a discussion of our strategic case selection and variability sampling, after which we focus on four shared issue frames of online radicalisation. We conclude by offering recommendations for further research, policy, and practice, emphasising in particular the surprising convergences between the various stakeholders.

Working Apart Together? The Radicalisation Governance Milieu, the Problem of Cooperation and Coordination, and the Assumption of Irreconcilable Differences

Radicalisation—and specifically online radicalisation—is not a word with a stable meaning, as noted above; it means different things to different actors, either within or beyond law enforcement. In this article, we highlight *issue frames* as shaping and informing how radicalisation is understood and acted upon.[16] The notion of an issue frame, which we can trace back to Erving Goffman's seminal work on frames as 'schemata of interpretation' that shape the way individuals 'perceive, label, and identify' phenomena and guide them in their (social) action,[17] is helpful to understand how a concept such as 'online radicalisation' acquires specific meanings, depending on the specific issue frame adopted. Issue frames, then, become more or less structured ways to define, construct, and contest particular social problems or controversies,[18] and often distribute specific responsibilities to specific social actors.

In the field of radicalisation, the *securitisation issue frame* has been especially dominant. Within this frame, radicalisation tends to be understood as an imminent threat to national security, and primarily a responsibility of and for law enforcement, which tends to give rise to difficult ethical, legal, and practical questions about the role of local law enforcement in ensuring not only local and public safety but also national security.[19] For example, the emphasis on threats intrinsic to this issue frame may be mobilised to strategically introduce and legitimise far-reaching measures of prevention and control, even where those challenge civil rights.[20] Meanwhile, such securitised issue frames often decontextualise the phenomenon of radicalisation, while the rivalling *community policing issue frame* of radicalisation asks for more consideration of the broader social embeddedness of radicalisation processes in specific communities. This frame also tends to emphasise outreach and community relations by law enforcement,[21] and points to the importance of non-law enforcement actors such as community leaders in shaping conditions for deradicalisation.[22]

Online radicalisation, furthermore, also invites the engagement of legal and policy advisors, cyber security specialists as well as privacy watchdogs and NGOs, who in varying ways may contribute to the specific framings of online radicalisation as a phenomenon more or less amenable to digital forms of surveillance and control, and more or less linked with offline processes.[23] As such, online radicalisation also becomes an object of yet new frames of understanding radicalisation, as, for instance, an 'onlife' phenomenon, blending on- and offline dynamics.[24] Issue frames, then, order and structure social actors' understanding of the social world, and there are often considerable tensions between and within such issue frames.

Contemporary literature further assumes that specific stakeholder communities operate on the basis of diverging issue frames. For instance, community leaders, because of their familiarity – and sustained engagement – with their communities, tend to challenge the securitisation frame,[25] while law enforcement professionals are thought to frame radicalisation as an imminent threat to public and national security and act accordingly. National differences in policing cultures may also be a factor in explaining the adoption of divergent issue frames between LEAs.[26] Crucially, these differences are then thought to explain a broader lack of interprofessional cooperation and coordination in radicalisation governance networks, both nationally and internationally. Noordegraaf et al. contend that successful cooperation requires a better, albeit not entirely identical, and more commonly shared understanding of the nature of the problem.[27] Achieving a somewhat shared understanding of online radicalisation and related phenomena is thought to be challenging, as perspectives develop within specific disciplines where formal education, training, and networks exert normative pressure, shaping the values, principles, and professional identities of those involved.[28] However, evidence for the existence of different perspectives is mixed: while there are some differences present at a granular level of analysis, researchers may also point to surprising convergences between professional and social groups in the way they define and frame online radicalisation.[29] Our research here is an attempt to tackle this critical gap in the literature, and to empirically tease out commonalities as well as differences within the broader online radicalisation milieu.

In order, then, to get a deeper understanding of the commonalities and differences of conceptions of online radicalisation among professionals in different contexts, we designed a study to answer the following questions: How do law enforcement, religious and community leaders, activists, and experts in different European countries approach and frame online radicalisation? How do they perceive surveillance and the supposed trade-off between privacy and security regarding the prevention of online radicalisation?[30] On what concerns do they base their considerations and insights? To what extent are they aligned, and how do they differ? The study was part of PROPHETS, an EU-funded Horizon 2020 project which ran from 2018 to 2021.[31] PROPHETS

was a collaboration between law enforcement agencies, academic institutions and centres of expertise across Europe and had as its goal to 'look at redefining new methods to prevent, investigate and mitigate cybercriminal behaviours'.[32] The deliverable on which we draw for this article was coordinated by Erasmus University Rotterdam and had as its goal to investigate the opinions of citizens and LEAs about the supposed privacy-security trade-off in dealing with online radicalisation.[33]

Cases and Method: Maximising National and Professional Variability, Semi-Structured Interviewing

Guided by the question of how stakeholders within different national and professional communities define and frame online radicalisation, we adopted a strategy of maximising stakeholder variability in our selection of cases.[34] Inspired by our multi-stakeholder understanding of countering online radicalisation, we identified three important groups: (A) law enforcement actors, (B) religious and community leaders, and (C) policy advisors and activists. These groups were chosen because they are deemed important within the aforementioned community policing issue frame. Over the course of our investigation, we added a fourth category—(D) experts whose work directly or indirectly engages with online radicalisation, and whose work specifically engages with novel challenges and problems associated with the online dimensions of radicalisation. Our selected professional groups are structurally situated highly differently in relation to online radicalisation: while LEAs are charged with preventing and acting on online radicalisation, community leaders tend to be more engaged with their communities. Policy advisors and activists in the field of online security, meanwhile, were initially expected to highlight legal constraints and specific advantages and risks of online surveillance, while the fourth category, academic experts in the field of online culture and surveillance, presented itself over the course of the investigation as a group contributing to societal debates and awareness of online radicalisation as well.

As online radicalisation is an internationally salient phenomenon, we strategically selected seven European countries – Netherlands, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Greece, and Italy. These countries were selected for two reasons. First, combining countries from Western, Eastern, and Southern Europe, this selection was geared to represent regional variation throughout Europe. Secondly, these countries all have a variety of experiences with terror attacks and/or arrests in 2019 when we collected our data:[35] Eastern Europe (Estonia: 0 attacks and arrests), Western Europe (Netherlands: 2 attacks, 37 arrests), Central Europe (Germany: 3 attacks, 35 arrests), Southern Europe (Italy: 28 attacks, 132 arrests; Greece: 4 attacks, 7 arrests), Southeast Europe (Bulgaria: 1 attack, 11 arrests; Croatia: 0 attacks and arrests). As a result, our selection of countries represents a strongly varied sample and, as such, maximises contextual diversity.

A total of 66 interviews were conducted across the aforementioned EU countries. Table 1 (see below) displays the distribution of informants by stakeholder group and country. In selecting individuals for interviews, the project sought to find a harmonious balance between the aforementioned stakeholder groups in each country. While the sample, in demographic terms, skews older and male, it nevertheless represents a highly diverse and, therefore, unique sample of stakeholders in the broader online radicalisation monitoring and governance milieu. While not generalisable to all such networks and milieus across Europe due to the unique composition of countries, it nevertheless contributes to a broader, cross-national understanding of stakeholder conceptions and problematisations.

Table 1: Distribution of Informants by Stakeholder Group and Country

	A. LEAs (in private sector)	B. Religious/ community leaders	C. Policy advisors/ activists	D. Experts	**Total**
Bulgaria	4	1	4	3	**12**
Croatia	4 (1)	3	2	0	**9**
Estonia	3 (1)	4	4	0	**11**
Germany	5	3	1	0	**9**
Greece	3	0	0	2	**5**
Italy	5 (1)	3	3	1	**12**
Netherlands	1	2	1	4	**8**
Total	**25 (3)**	**16**	**15**	**10**	**66**

Semi-Structured Interviews: Constructivist Tenets and Variation-Maximising Scenarios[36]

The interviews employed an interview guide approach, ensuring consistent pursuit of fundamental lines of inquiry while allowing the interviewer the flexibility to probe and explore.[37] This approach helped informants to outline their occupational background and career, as well as reflect on four predefined themes: safety and security, (online) radicalisation, surveillance and privacy. In so doing, we aimed to explore stakeholders' specific insights, conceptions and problematisations,[38] keeping an eye out for both similarities and differences. Following Ravn et al., we stress that the interpretation and approach to radicalisation are not objective but rather a subjective understanding that has developed over time,[39] and thus examine what subjective understandings stakeholders mobilise to frame online radicalisation. As such, we asked open-ended questions to probe the meanings our informants attribute to online radicalisation and asked them to elaborately reflect on their reasoning. The guide included a list of 38 suggested questions, intended as examples or guidelines rather than a checklist to be completed in a specific order.

In the design of these interview guidelines, we were helped by a survey, executed in the context of the same research project.[40] This survey was used to define areas of concern to LEA and non-LEA actors, such as the balance between public safety and individual rights and the novel opportunities represented by the internet. The survey data was also used to construct four scenarios, which offered specific, fictional examples of online radicalisation taking place in a context of heightened security risk to the national population and legalised, algorithmically assisted forms of police investigation.[41] These scenarios were constructed to maximise variability once again, including, in different constellations, scenarios involving vulnerable or influential *enablers* of radicalisation and vulnerable or influential *perpetrators* of radicalised action.

Interestingly, while the quantitative survey data demonstrated some differences between LEA and non-LEA professionals in their acceptance of online surveillance of suspect activities.[42] the qualitative interviews yielded surprising resonances in the broader meanings and issue frames our informants mobilise when prompted to more fully and elaborately engage with online radicalisation. We will reflect on this difference in the conclusion of this paper.

In order to zoom in on recurring issue frames, we adopted a method of inductive coding, a coding procedure that foregrounds interviewees' own perspectives, definitions, and accounts on a given set of issues. In so doing, we arrived at four specific issue frames that were remarkably similar across countries and actor groups. In the coming pages, research participants will be denoted by means of their nationality (e.g. NL) and number (e.g. 05), and by their stakeholder category (A = LEA, B = religious or community leader, C = policy advisor or activist, and D = expert) in order to safeguard their anonymity.

Framing 'Online Radicalisation': Data and Analysis

Like most terms, the notion of 'online radicalisation' evokes a host of not necessarily coherent meanings and associations. In the following, however, we zoom in on four largely shared issue frames. The first of these emphasises the tension between approaching online radicalisation as an individual process versus a socially contextualised practice; the second issue frame emphasises the national embeddedness of the very definition of radicalisation and its use in specific national and political contexts; the third issue frame highlights the complex politics of online security, while the fourth issue frame approaches the monitoring of online radicalisation, particularly so by means of 'mysterious' algorithms, as a practical and pragmatic challenge.

It is, however, important to notice from the start that radicalisation itself is not a term with a stable meaning to our informants. When asked to define radicalisation, informants often posit it as a process resulting in the desire to take away freedoms from others, implicitly understanding radicalisation as a threat to others' positive freedoms. Informants may also associate it with becoming obsessed or stuck in a 'bubble' (BG05C) and suffering from 'tunnel vision' (e.g. EST04B and DE07B), with people losing awareness of broader society and rejecting, in particular, diversity of opinion and way of life. They also associate it with extremism, yet also express a rather complex understanding of what is to be counted as 'extreme', which may, in fact, simply be an 'exaggeration of something intrinsically positive' (HR02B), hence subtly distinguishing between extremism and violent extremism in action. Indeed, radicalisation may even have emancipatory potential (DE03A), it being a process whereby previously unrepresented people claim a voice and public visibility. In this regard, too, our informants challenge simple models of radicalisation that fail to distinguish between these two – a particularly problematic tendency, as specifically adolescence can be characterised in general as a transition period marked by extreme emotions and opinions.[43] Indeed, 'the line distinguishing a radicalised person from a person who wants a better future for his or her children is very thin', one police officer comments (BG03A). Given this unstable character of the term radicalisation, it is no surprise, then, that we see our respondents mobilise the following four issue frames to attend to its complexity.

1) The Roots of Radicalisation: The Isolated Individual and/or the Broader Social Context

When asked to reflect on why and how certain individuals are radicalised – or radicalise themselves – our respondents generally identified an important tension between individual-level explanations on the one hand, and broader social processes and dynamics on the other. Some informants emphasised certain individual characteristics such as low intelligence and lack of critical thinking skills, low educational attainments, or a bad childhood and traumatic experiences, whereas others privileged social and economic factors in their explanations, ranging widely from unemployment (e.g. some people 'don't have a normal life or anything else to do', EST02D), economic deprivation, to broader societal injustices against specific minorities (DE04A). At the same time, our informants also articulated holistic approaches to radicalisation, which tend to understand radicalisation as a multifactorial, sometimes multi-staged process,

involving both precipitating causes and triggering catalysts that evolve to a 'point of no return' (DE04A). On the one hand, then, they put forth the trope of the radicalising 'lone wolf', but point to the structural factors that allow such 'lone wolves' to emerge in the first place.

Informants also reflected specifically on the impact of online media, suggesting that online media and the algorithms that steer users to specific content play an important role in their radicalisation. Some emphasised, for instance, the 'bubble' created in certain online spaces, pointed to the wide reach of such media, and also pointed out that spending a lot of time online is simply incompatible with living a more socially engaged life in one's community. Here, the online world represents an additional social scene that may compensate for the alienation individuals experience in broader society.

For our informants, the multifactorial nature of radicalisation poses the challenge of how to effectively intervene and stop these processes. If they are a matter of complex interlocking causes and catalysts, where do you focus your efforts to halt or subvert such radicalisation processes? Here, informants generally emphasised community-based solutions targeting especially vulnerable populations and individuals within these populations as a first and crucial step. For instance, informants mentioned it is possible to target those 'without strong social ties' (IT05A), by offering strong education programs and educational efforts to combat radicalisation (GR03B) or state-sponsored reintegration programs highlighting sports and civic education (DE02A). The extent to which our informants thought these more general efforts should be combined with online surveillance and security efforts is a question that will be dealt with below (see issue frame number three) after we have discussed the importance of national and political contexts to our informants.

2) The Importance of (National and Political) Context: Radicalisation as a Moving Target

Throughout the interviews, many of our informants emphasised the importance of specific national and political contexts in confronting online radicalisation. The importance of such contexts could be presented implicitly, in references to country-specific phenomena of interest: e.g. our informants from Bulgaria often used football as an example of a social setting in which radicalisation may occur, an emphasis which echoes the strong right-wing presence within Bulgarian football hooliganism.[44] More explicit framings of the importance of national and political contexts were also present, however. For instance, many of our informants commented on the supposed link between radicalisation and Islam or migrant communities, yet contest the assumption that radicalisation is something that only or uniquely affects such communities. Most of our German police officers, for instance, noted that it is a mistake to think that culture or Islam explains Islamic radicalisation; instead, the roots of these processes have to be sought in experiences of socio-economic deprivation and anti-Muslim discrimination (DE01A, DE02A, DE03A, DE05A). This recognition is echoed by informants who variously pointed to Christianity as a source of radicalisation (EST09C) and who see the idea that radicalisation only or uniquely affects Muslim communities as deeply irrational (IT09C). Moreover, religious or ethnic identifications are themselves not stable or given but may assume a particular salience in specific contexts: an Italian law enforcement professional emphasised, for instance, that in order to understand radicalisation processes in, and as mediated by, the broader Balkan area, one has to account for politically motivated mobilisation of such identities in recent history (IT01A).

Indeed, some challenged the very label of the 'radical' itself, understanding it as a political tool in majority attempts to silence or marginalise specific communities who may be in the process

of arguing for community rights and justice (EST02D). For instance, a Dutch Muslim community worker emphasised that mainstream political discourse in the Netherlands is itself radicalised and anti-Muslim, wondering whether this radical 'centre' is not more harmful societally than the youth she works with. Commenting on the scenario involving a radical and homophobic Imam, she confided in the researcher: "Can I be honest? What this imam does is very bad. What he says. But if I compare this with Wilders," – Geert Wilders is a prominent right-wing, anti-Islam politician in the Netherlands – "I mean, that is a hundred times as bad. [...] Because he [Wilders] affects the whole society. And whatever that Imam says, at least it doesn't affect the whole of society" (NL05B). Her appraisal of these exclusionary, Islamophobic discourses was shared, coincidentally, with that of a Dutch rabbi, who similarly lamented the ease with which the right wing was projecting anti-Semitism onto Muslims – conveniently remaining silent about anti-Semitism within its own ranks and within broader mainstream society.

Taken together, these data suggest that our informants operate with an issue frame of radicalisation that understands it to be a 'moving target' for our informants: a term that fails to have a stable meaning across contexts, and that – as they argue – becomes implicated in specific political agendas. The broader implications of such stakeholder issue framing of radicalisation will be unpacked more fully in the conclusion, but suffice to say here that these contestations and challenges of dominant radicalisation frames test the definitional power of authorities in delineating 'radicalisation'.

3) The Politics of Online Surveillance and Security: A 'Delicate Balance'

Speaking more specifically of forms of online radicalisation, many of our informants were quick to point out that online surveillance and online security may play a crucial role in combating online radicalisation: after all, state authorities do have the responsibility to ensure security for their citizens. Offending websites of online fora may be taken down (GR02A), for instance, and patterns of internet use may provide hints about specific individuals. However, we were struck particularly by the broader issues our informants brought up when it came to online surveillance and security in what we call the issue frame of 'finding a balance'. Some of our informants focused on issues related to privacy, particularly the balance between individual privacy and state power. There should not be 'mass surveillance' of entire populations, for instance (GR04A), nor should law enforcement seek to emulate Chinese (DE04A) or Russian (IT10B) authorities, or even the UK, with its massive amount of CCTV (DE05A). Serving as a counterpoint to more moderate and privacy-sensitive use of surveillance technologies, these countries were thought to have transgressed the boundary separating legitimate from illegitimate use.

Targeted surveillance of specific populations, however, was also thought to be fraught with ethical dangers. Such efforts may reinforce negative stereotypes, 'put labels on people', (GR03D), and have discriminatory effects more broadly. At the level of the individual, surveillance may be especially dangerous as well: if used in the wrong way – without certain contextual safeguards (see issue frame number four below) – it may even 'jeopardise someone's life' (HR02C) when law enforcement acts on spurious information. Even when certain societal fears of surveillance may be somewhat 'overblown' (EST01D), informants generally emphasised the necessity of proper legal and regulatory frameworks and democratic accountability mechanisms. For this reason, private ownership of the means of online surveillance or the data hence generated may exacerbate these dilemmas, creating a situation in which surveillance methods may 'evade the public eye' (NL07D).

In this context, some informants again pointed to local histories of governmental surveillance and control (see issue frame number two above). A Dutch rabbi, for instance, was particularly

hesitant when it came to online surveillance, bringing to mind how, under the German occupation of 1940-1945, the German occupying forces had a rather well-developed bureaucracy at its disposal detailing (among other things) the place of residence of its Jewish citizens. It is often claimed that this is the reason for the particularly high percentage of Dutch Jews deported during the Holocaust.[45] This history explains his hesitance to support large-scale surveillance of targeted populations, even when they threaten his Synagogue's safety and security. In so doing, he brought to mind the ill uses to which such instruments may be put and their more general tendency towards 'function creep' – an insistence that mirrors more general public anxieties with regard to such processes of creep.[46] As a result, we suggest that our informants share this concern for the potentially undemocratic and unaccountable uses of surveillance algorithms and generally adopt an issue frame in which online monitoring is conceived of as a delicate balancing act.

4) The Mysteries and Limitations of Algorithmic Surveillance

Aside from the more political and ethical issues we unpacked in issue frame number three, our informants also tended to stress the pragmatic limitations of digital surveillance. First of all, the internet itself is evolving so fast that the use of online surveillance is simply limited: once the algorithm has 'learned' to recognise certain patterns, radicalising communities may already have moved on, so that 'we're tapping in the dark' (HR03D). But the opacity of the 'inner workings' of surveillance algorithms was also taken to represent a pragmatic problem. Algorithms, being changeable and self-learning, depend on the quality of the data they are fed, and it is not always clear how they end up attributing risk. The extent to which algorithms can accurately 'read' and understand human interaction is also a specific point of critique: while some argue that massive data storage and analysis may help to distinguish those who are seriously radicalising from those who 'simply tell a joke' (HR02C), 'robots' are nevertheless thought to inadequately understand the meaning behind specific online utterances (IT06D).

An additional and crucial problem our informants tended to associate with surveillance algorithms is what we call the problem of context. While algorithms may be excellent at pattern recognition, they provide little detail about the how and why of radicalisation in specific cases, nor do they adequately predict actual risk. One participant argued that as algorithms have initially been developed to predict chess games – situations with a lot of variation, but predictable rules – they are severely limited when it comes to predicting terrorist attacks, as these are caused by much more variable and less rule-bound factors (NL07B). More generally, however, our informants tended to place absolute importance on grounding one's understanding of specific individual risk profiles in hands-on experience and specific and detailed police investigation – often assisted by information from within the community (if there is one). A Bulgarian LEA emphasised that if algorithms offer the 'theoretical' knowledge, there is simply no substitution for the 'practical experience' that comes with 'being out there in the community' (BG03A). In general, then, our informants approached the promise of algorithmic control with a lot of caution, framing the issue as one of closely attending to, and mitigating, the inherent 'mysteries' and pragmatic limitations of algorithmic surveillance.

Conclusion

We identified four recurring issue frames: (1) individual vs. social explanations, (2) social/political embedding, (3) online surveillance as a balance, and (4) complexities of algorithmic surveillance. As such, our informants recognised the tension, also present within academic research on radicalisation, between individual-level and social explanations for radicalisation.[47] Our informants also alerted us to the political uses of the term 'radicalisation' and implicitly or explicitly contested the idea that the term is a neutral descriptor. Emphasising the political

nature of radicalisation discourse, our informants were rather close to contemporary criticisms of the ideological uses and assumptions within radicalisation and terrorism discourses[48] and to research that emphasises broader unequal political and social milieus within which specific radicalisation processes take place.[49] Some informants also raised the possibility that radicalisation may have benign, even emancipatory effects.[50] Meanwhile, they seemed acutely aware of the ethical, legal, and political challenges of online surveillance, as evident by their use of the balancing act frame, while they also pointed to the pragmatic problems of meaning and context that accompany algorithmic policing.

We have also demonstrated that these issue frames are largely shared between our informants – a surprising finding, as our sample is highly diverse both in national contexts and in professional terms. Instead of setting dividing lines and a lack of shared understanding of the radicalisation process – as has traditionally been assumed – stakeholders across professional groups actually demonstrated a shared understanding of this phenomenon. Hence, it is likely that whichever challenges exist in stakeholders' collaboration, these do not largely stem from diverse normative stances and issue frames but have to be explained by other factors, such as informational barriers, political and regulatory contexts, and more general collective action problems. Our data suggest harmonising national standards, like the 2015 EU criminal proceedings effort and the 2011 Radicalisation Awareness Network,[51] might rely on shared issue frames among key actors. Similarly, while police cultures and traditions may differ across countries[52] and countries may have highly specific experiences with radicalisation and extremist violence,[53] these shared issue frames provide some hope for future possibilities for coordination and cooperation. Our data, showing that LEAs tend to emphasise social factors in radicalisation and the value of community work and policing, also suggest that law enforcement actors are equipped and able to coordinate, cooperate, and possibly co-create with other stakeholders as well.

Practical Recommendations for Policy and Practice

We offer several concrete recommendations for those involved in online radicalisation efforts. First, our data suggest that our informants are acutely aware of the political uses of the radicalisation frame. Hence, specific conceptualisations of radicalisation – legal or otherwise – need to be accounted for and rendered explicit, as these may mitigate actors' hesitance to cooperate with or contribute to attempts to foster security and combat radicalisation. The hesitance of some of our informants in putting faith in state authorities when it comes to balancing privacy and the state's surveillance mandate is instructive in this regard, showing how national and political histories and contexts may influence the readiness of stakeholders to cooperate and coordinate action. Public concerns around the use of online surveillance and AI by law enforcement agencies[54] and discriminatory practices facilitated by predictive policing[55] AI further feed into this caution.

Second, our informants emphasised that online surveillance is an option fraught with ethical and political dilemmas. As such, surveillance instruments targeting specific populations should be precisely explained and detailed where possible. Especially in cases where the cooperation of crucial stakeholders within such communities is required (e.g. in prevention programs targeting specific communities), investigating and law enforcement actors should be ready to motivate the choice for specific technologies in order to take away or mitigate concerns with ethnic or religious profiling. This also means that in some cases, the choice for online surveillance may simply not be the best one given broader political pressures[56] and human rights concerns[57] – the fact that it is a possibility does not mean, in short, that it is the first or best option to explore.

Third, regardless of context, most informants stressed the practical limitations of online surveillance, emphasising the mysteries of algorithms and the decontextualised character of the information they yield. In other words, to be of use, they have to remain coupled with and firmly embedded within other investigatory practices. For those seeking to introduce online surveillance, it is imperative to explicitly account for the limitations of these technologies, and to highlight the centrality of 'good old-fashioned police work' in order to mobilise cooperation with law enforcement professionals. Moreover, a transparent emphasis on the limitations of such technologies may also mitigate other stakeholders' ethical and practical concerns with their mysterious power. The relevance of 'negotiated management',[58] thus personal interaction and flexible attempts to avoid coercive measures, has not only been proven to be more effective under several circumstances, but also to maintain or even enhance the legitimacy of the police in the broader society.

Finally, our study has identified a significant consensus regarding the issues surrounding the prevention and mitigation of online radicalisation. It is essential to note, however, that this consensus is based on respondents' self-reported beliefs and attitudes rather than their real-world actions when confronted with online radicalisation in their daily activities. Institutional theorists are quick to point out that, while organisations and their embedded actors might pay lip-service to the values and procedures that grant them institutional legitimacy, these can be largely decoupled from actions on the ground.[59]

In reference to the vignettes presented at the outset of this article, the political situation in both the Netherlands and the United States has evolved quite notably. In the Netherlands, the FvD secured three seats in the 150-seat House of Representatives – a stark departure from its 2019 success in regional elections, during which it emerged as the largest political party. Meanwhile, in the United States, legal proceedings have resulted in the conviction of more than seven hundred people associated with the January 6th storming of the Capitol, including key leaders of organisations like the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys.[60]

Nonetheless, the issue of radicalisation continues to be a prominent concern on the policy agenda of both nations. As of the time of writing, former President Donald Trump is leading the polls for the 2024 presidential election, despite being found guilty of 34 felony counts of falsifying business records and facing a number of other legal challenges. Further, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, a majority of Republican voters still think their candidate is the 'true' winner of the 2020 presidential election.[61] Additionally, radicalisation via social media remains a pressing issue in the country.[62] And even though we have to be mindful of how the discourse around polarisation can be seen as a way to not discuss material politics,[63] mutual antipathy among ideological factions in the Netherlands remains on the rise as well,[64] especially manifesting itself around issues of gender and sexuality.[65] In light of these ongoing developments, it is advisable for national governments to heed the voices of those on the ground – who, according to our study, are surprisingly aligned in their assessment of the issue and aware of the nuances and pitfalls that come with addressing such a fractal phenomenon.

Irene van Oorschot is an assistant professor at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam, where she focuses on qualitative inquiry in fields such as law, forensics, and environmental management. Her book The Law Multiple (Cambridge University Press, 2021) *offers an ethnographic account of legal practices and sociological knowledges.*

Giorgio Touburg is a lecturer in qualitative methods at the KIN Center for Digital Innovation, VU University Amsterdam. He is currently pursuing a PhD at the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University. Giorgio has conducted research on a variety of topics, including knowledge migration and cultural differences at work.

Alexander Strelkov is a senior lecturer at Erasmus University College, Erasmus University Rotterdam. A political scientist by training, his research focuses on international regime theory, EU foreign policy, political dynamics in Eurasia and the Balkans, and democracy promotion, using qualitative methods to provide policy insights.

Gabriele Jacobs is professor of Organisational Behaviour and Culture at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. In her research, she mainly focusses on the context of public safety. Other research interests include organisational change, culture, multi-stakeholder management and co-creation. She coordinated and conducted several national and EU-projects in the field of safety and security.

Endnotes

1 Stephanie Burnett, Stephen Farrell and Hardik Vyas, "Disinformation Surge Threatens to Fuel Israel-Hamas Conflict", *Reuters,* 18 October 2023, sec. World, https://www.reuters.com/world/disinformation-surge-threatens-fuel-israel-hamas-conflict-2023-10-18/; European Council/Council of the European Union, "The Fight against Pro-Kremlin Disinformation", 20 January 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/library/library-blog/posts/the-fight-against-pro-kremlin-disinformation/.

2 Europol, *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2020* (Brussels: Europol, 2020), https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/european_union_terrorism_situation_and_trend_report_te-sat_2020_0.pdf.

3 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Toward a Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists: What Moves an Individual From Radical Opinion to Radical Action", *Terrorism and Political Violence,* Vol. 26, no. 1 (2014), 69-85, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849916.

4 Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers, *Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on "Hate Speech"* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1997), http://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680505d5b.

5 The concept of desensitisation originally refers to the moral indifference stemming from modern bureaucratic systems and their division of labor. The reliance on bureaucratic rule and formal rationality entails a disengagement from ethical considerations. See: Zygmunt Bauman, *The Holocaust and Modernity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). Media psychologists have been using the term to describe the sense of numbness and indifference experienced when exposed to violence for a considerable amount of time, both in real life and in media. See: Sylvie Mrug, Anja Madan, Edwin W. Cook III and Rex A. Wright, "Emotional and Physiological Desensitization to Real-Life and Movie Violence", *Journal of Youth and Adolescence,* Vol. 44, no. 5 (2015), 1092-1108, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-014-0202-z. While the thesis has not been fully embraced by the psychological community, as PTSS due to exposure to violence is known to actually *raise* stress levels when confronted with new instances of violence, recent speculations suggest that desensitisation may be an intended outcome of terrorist propaganda and prove particularly effective in an era of social media. See: Asa Don Brown, "Desensitization of Terrorism. The Influence of the Media and Social Media", *Psychology Today,* 30 March 2017, sec. Media, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/towards-recovery/201705/desensitization-terrorism.

6 Kristin Göbel and Herbert Scheithauer, *Micro Level Report on Vulnerable Actor Behavioral Radicalisation,* PROPHETS (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/documents/downloadPublic?documentIds=080166e5d541e571&appId=PPGMS.

7 Nicolas Campelo, Alice Oppetit, Françoise Neau, David Cohen and Guillaume Bronsard, "Who Are the European Youths Willing to Engage in Radicalisation? A Multidisciplinary Review of their Psychological and Social Profiles", *European Psychiatry,* Vol. 52, August 2018 (2018): 1-14, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2018.03.001.

8 Anna Grøndahl Larsen, "Threatening Criminals and Marginalized Individuals: Frames and News Conventions in Reporting of Radicalization and Violent Extremism", *Media, War & Conflict,* Vol. 12, no. 3 (2019), 299-316, https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635218769331.

9 Thomas E. Nelson, Zoe M. Oxley and Rosalee A. Clawson, "Toward A Psychology of Framing Effects", *Political Behavior*, Vol. 19, no. 3 (1997), 221-46; see particularly Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 21.

10 Peter Mandaville and Melissa Nozell, *Engaging Religion and Religious Actors in Countering Violent Extremism,* Special Report (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2017), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR413-Engaging-Religion-and-Religious-Actors-in-Countering-Violent-Extremism.pdf; Kaja Prislan, Krunoslav Borovec and Irena Cajner Mraović, "The Role of Civil Society and Communities in Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation", *Policija i sigurnost*, Vol. 29, no. 3 (2020), 223-45, https://hrcak.srce.hr/243827.

11 Göbel and Scheithauer, *Micro Level Report on Vulnerable Actor Behavioral Radicalisation*, 2.

12 Randy Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories", *Journal of Strategic Security,* Vol. 4, no. 4 (2011), 7-36, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.1.

13 Daniel Koehler and Verena Fiebig, "Knowing What to Do: Academic and Practitioner Understanding of How to Counter Violent Radicalization", *Perspectives on Terrorism,* Vol. 13, no. 3 (2019), 44-62, https://pt.icct.nl/article/knowing-what-do-academic-and-practitioner-understanding-how-counter-violent-radicalization.

14 Annemarie van de Weert and Quirine A.M. Eijkman, "In Every Artery of Society? How Dutch Community

Police Officers Perceive Their Role in Early Detection of Violent Extremism among Youth", *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice,* Vol. 15, no. 2 (2021), 1144-57, https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paaa038.

15 Håvard Haugstvedt, "Trusting the Mistrusted: Norwegian Social Workers' Strategies in Preventing Radicalization and Violent Extremism", *Journal for Deradicalization,* Vol. 19, Summer 2019 (2019), 149-84, https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2654253.

16 Larsen, "Threatening Criminals and Marginalized Individuals: Frames and News Conventions in Reporting of Radicalization and Violent Extremism".

17 Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*, 21.

18 Nelson et al., "Toward a Psychology of Framing Effects".

19 Brian Forst, "Local Police and the "War" on Terrorism", in *The Oxford Handbook of Police and Policing*, eds. Michael Dean Reisig and Robert J. Kane (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 623-42, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199843886.013.003.

20 Dagmar Rychnovská, "Securitization and the Power of Threat Framing", *Perspectives: Review of International Affairs,* Vol. 22, no. 2 (2014), 9-32, https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=106821.

21 Gary Cordner, "Community Policing", in *The Oxford Handbook of Police and Policing*, eds. Michael Dean Reisig and Robert J. Kane (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 148-71, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199843886.013.012.

22 cf. Lídia Puigvert, Emilia Aiello, Esther Oliver and Mimar Ramis-Salas, "Grassroots Community Actors Leading the Way in the Prevention of Youth Violent Radicalisation", *PLoS ONE,* Vol. 15, nr. 10 (2020), e0239897, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0239897.

23 Daniele Valentini, Anna Maria Lorusso and Achim Stephan, "Onlife Extremism: Dynamic Integration of Digital and Physical Spaces in Radicalization", *Frontiers in Psychology,* Vol. 11 (2020), 524, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00524.

24 Ibid.

25 Sipco Vellenga and Kees de Groot, "Securitization, Islamic Chaplaincy, and the Issue of (De) Radicalization of Muslim Detainees in Dutch Prisons", *Social Compass,* Vol. 66, no. 2 (2019), 224-37, https://doi.org/10.1177/0037768619833313.

26 Petra Saskia Bayerl, Kate E. Horton, Gabriele Jacobs, Sofie Rogiest, Zdenko Reguli, Mario Gruschinske, Pietro Constanzo, Trpe Stojanovski, Gabriel Vonas, Mila Gascó and Karen Elliott, "Perspectives on the Police Profession: An International Investigation", *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management,* Vol. 37, no. 4 (2014), 728-45, https://doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-11-2013-0112.

27 Mirko Noordegraaf, Leonie Heres, Niels Terpsta, Aline Bos, Emile W. Kolthoff, Clara Bovens and Annemarie van de Wilt, "Krachtige lerende netwerken: samenwerkend leren in interorganisationele netwerken voor aanpak van terrorisme en criminaliteit", USBO-advies (Utrecht: Utrecht University, 2020), 54, https://repository.tudelft.nl/assets/uuid:edee2014-087c-4bf4-9354-db28bc465dee/2953_Volledige_Tekst_tcm28-467431.pdf.

28 Ibid.

29 Bayerl et al., "Perspectives on the Police Profession: An International Investigation".

30 Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis Taylor and Liad Wagman, "The Economics of Privacy", *Journal of Economic Literature,* Vol. 54, no. 2 (2016), 442-92, https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.54.2.442; Darren W. Davis and Brian D. Silver, "Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America", *American Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 48, no. 1 (2004), 28-46, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00054.x.

31 *European Commission,* "Preventing Radicalisation Online through the Proliferation of Harmonised ToolkitS: Fact Sheet", 25 July 2022, https://doi.org/10.3030/786894.

32 Ibid.

33 Theoni Spathi, Alexander Strelkov, and Gabriele Jacobs, *Report on Privacy and Security Safeguards,* PROPHETS (Thessaloniki: KEMEA, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/documents/downloadPublic?documentIds=080166e5d4f8e72f&appId=PPGMS.

34 cf. Bent Flyvbjerg, "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research", *Qualitative Inquiry,* Vol. 12, no. 2 (2006), 219-45, https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800405284363.

35 Europol, *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2020*.

36 Ethical approval from the European Commission was a prerequisite for funding the PROPHETS project. Representatives from the European Commission also incorporated ethics considerations into their mid-term review. Additionally, a Security, Ethics & Confidentiality Committee (SECC) was established at the project's inception, which supervised the confidentiality, project integrity, and project-specific information produced by PROPHETS. For this specific deliverable, coordinated by Erasmus University Rotterdam, additional approval was obtained from the university's Data Protection Officer (DPO).

37 Michael Q. Patton, *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods,* third ed. (Thousand Oaks/London/New Delhi: Sage, 2002), 343-44.

38 Anselm C. Strauss and Juliet M. Corbin, *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*, second ed. (Thousand Oaks/London/New Delhi: Sage, 1998).

39 Stiene Ravn, Rik Coolsaet and Tom Sauer, "Rethinking Radicalisation: Addressing the Lack of a Contextual Perspective in the Dominant Narratives on Radicalisation", in *Radicalisation: A Marginal Phenomenon or a Mirror to Society?*, eds. Noel Clycq, Christian Timmerman, Dirk Vanheule, Rut Van Caudenberg and Stiene Ravn (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2019), 21.

40 Spathi, Strelkov and Jacobs, *Report on Privacy and Security Safeguards.*

41 For the full scenarios, see Spathi, Strelkov and Jacobs, *Report on Privacy and Security Safeguards,* 43-44.

42 Spathi, Strelkov and Jacobs, *Report on Privacy and Security Safeguards,* 17-18.

43 See especially Erica Harper, "Reconceptualizing the Drivers of Violent Extremism: An Agenda for Child & Youth Resilience" (Cologny: Terre des Hommes, 2018), https://www.tdh.ch/sites/default/files/tdh_wana_pve_en_light.pdf, 8.

44 Georgi Ganev Georgiev, *Soccer Hooligans, Ethnic Nationalism and Political Economy in Bulgaria*, Master's thesis (St. Cloud: St. Cloud State University, 2017), https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=socresp_etds.

45 cf. Bob Moore, *Victims and Survivors: The Nazi Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, 1940-1945* (New York/London: Arnold, 1997); however, see for alternative explanations e.g. Pim Griffioen and Ron Zeller, "Anti-Jewish Policy and Organization of the Deportations in France and the Netherlands, 1940–1944: A Comparative Study", *Holocaust and Genocide Studies,* Vol. 20, no. 3 (2006), 437-73, https://doi.org/10.1093/hgs/dcl021.

46 cf. Michael Friedewald, J. Peter Burgess, Johan Čas, Rocco Bellanova and Walter Peissl, eds., *Surveillance, Privacy and Security: Citizens' Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2017).

47 Ravn, Coolsaet and Sauer, "Rethinking Radicalisation: Addressing the Lack of a Contextual Perspective in the Dominant Narratives on Radicalisation", 27.

48 Arun Kundnani, "Radicalisation: The Journey of a Concept", *Race & Class,* Vol. 54, no. 2 (2012), 3-25, https://10.1177/0306396812454984.

49 Joel Busher and Graham Macklin, "Interpreting "Cumulative Extremism": Six Proposals for Enhancing Conceptual Clarity", *Terrorism and Political Violence,* Vol. 27, no. 5 (2015), 884-905, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.870556.

50 See also Ken Reidy, "Benevolent Radicalization: An Antidote to Terrorism", *Perspectives on Terrorism,* Vol. 13, no. 4 (2019), 1-13, https://pt.icct.nl/article/benevolent-radicalization-antidote-terrorism.

51 Judy Korn, "European CVE Strategies from a Practitioner's Perspective", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 668, no. 1 (2016), 180-97, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716216671888.

52 Bayerl et al., "Perspectives on the Police Profession: An International Investigation"; Gorazd Meško, Andrej Sotlar and Branko Lobnikar, "Policing in Central Europe: Past, Present, and Future Prospects", in *The Oxford Handbook of Police and Policing*, eds. Michael Dean Reisig and Robert J. Kane (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 606-22, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199843886.013.009.

53 Riazat Butt and Henry Tuck, *European Counter-Radicalisation and De-radicalisation: A Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany,* Cross-Country Evaluation Report (London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014), https://www.exit-practices.eu/uploads/1/3/0/4/130474014/butt_r.___tuck_h.__2014_._european_counter-radicalisation_and_de-radicalisation_a_comparative_evaluation_of_approaches_in_the_netherlands_sweden_denmar.pdf.

54 Lisa O'Carroll, "EU Agrees Tough Limits on Police Use of AI Biometric Surveillance", *The Guardian,* 11 December 2023, sec. Surveillance, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/11/eu-agrees-tough-rules-on-police-use-of-ai-biometric-surveillance-ban.

55 Rashida Richardson, Jason M. Schultz and Kate Crawford, "Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice", *NYUL Rev. Online*, Vol. 94 (2019), 15-55, https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/nyulro94&id=15&collection=journals&index=.

56 Desmond Upton Patton, Douglas-Wade Brunton, Andrea Dixon, Rueben Jonathan Miller, Patrick Leonard and Rose Hackman, "Stop and Frisk Online: Theorizing Everyday Racism in Digital Policing in the Use of Social Media for Identification of Criminal Conduct and Associations", *Social Media+ Society*, Vol. 3, no. 3 (2017), 2056305117733344, https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305117733344.

57 Monique Mann and Tobias Matzner, "Challenging Algorithmic Profiling: The Limits of Data Protection and Anti-discrimination in Responding to Emergent Discrimination", *Big Data & Society*, Vol. 6, no. 2 (2019), 2053951719895805, https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951719895805.

58 Jan Terpstra, "Policing Protest and the Avoidance of Violence: Dilemmas and Problems of Legitimacy", *Journal of Criminal Justice and Security*, Vol. 8, no. 3-4 (2006), 203-12, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/MeskoJCJS/221201to221219.pdf#page=25.

59 cf. John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony", *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 83, no. 2 (1977), 340-63, https://doi.org/10.1086/226550.

60 U.S. Department of Justice, "Three Years Since the Jan. 6 Attack on the Capitol" (January 5, 2024), https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/36-months-jan-6-attack-capitol-0; U.S. Department of Justice, "Court Sentences Two Oath Keepers Leaders on Seditious Conspiracy and Other Charges Related to U.S. Capitol Breach" (May 25, 2023), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/court-sentences-two-oath-keepers-leaders-seditious-conspiracy-and-other-charges-related-us ; U.S. Department of Justice, "Jury Convicts Four Leaders of the Proud Boys of Seditious Conspiracy Related to U.S. Capitol Breach" (May 5, 2023), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jury-convicts-four-leaders-proud-boys-seditious-conspiracy-related-us-capitol-breach

61 Chris Kahn, "53% of Republicans View Trump as True U.S. President", *Reuters,* 24 May 2021, sec. United States, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/53-republicans-view-trump-true-us-president-reutersipsos-2021-05-24/.

62 Annie Y. Chen, Brendan Nyhan, Jason Reifler, Ronald E. Robertson and Christo Wilson, "Subscriptions and External Links Help Drive Resentful Users to Alternative and Extremist YouTube Channels", *Science Advances,* Vol. 9, no. 35 (2023), eadd8080, https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.add8080.

63 Osita Nwanevu, "Which Side Are You On? We Can't Wish Polarization Away. We Have to Fight It", *The New Republic,* Vol. 251, no. 6 (2020), 46-50.

64 Eelco Harteveld, "Fragmented Foes: Affective Polarization in the Multiparty Context of the Netherlands", *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 71 (2021), 102332, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102332.

65 cf. Hanneke Sanou, "Drag Queens Who Read to Children Foil Far-right Demonstrators", *DutchNews.nl*, 17 April 2023, sec. *Society*, https://www.dutchnews.nl/2023/04/drag-queens-who-read-to-children-foil-far-right-demonstrators/.

About

Perspectives on Terrorism

Established in 2007, *Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) is a quarterly, peer-reviewed, and open-access academic journal. PT is a publication of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), in partnership with the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) at Leiden University, and the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews.

Copyright and Licensing

Contact

E: pt.editor@icct.nl
W: pt.icct.nl

Universiteit Leiden

HANDA CSTPV