This article argues that we should re-cast explanations of violent extremism and terrorism in terms of INUS-conditions: Insufficient but Necessary Parts of Unnecessary but Sufficient Conditions. First, I show that existing explanations of terrorism and critiques of such explanations often assume or even state expressis verbis that the conditions identified in such explanations must be either necessary or sufficient to do explanatory work. I then introduce the notion of an INUS-condition. It has been fruitfully employed in such fields as philosophy of science, forensic psychiatry, education theory, and the social sciences, but so far not in the study of terrorism and violent extremism. I first show by way of examples not related to terrorism how explanations in terms of INUS-conditions work. I then go on to illustrate that existing accounts in the literature on terrorism are best understood in terms of INUS-conditions. Finally, I lay out what all this means for the current and future study of terrorism and draw some conclusions.
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